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NOTES

THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME:
PROJECTIONS ON THE FATE OF THE
HOME MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
AND THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX IN
LIGHT OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR
KRISTEN McGOVERN PAINTER*

"THE HARDEST THING IN THE WORLD TO UNDERSTAND IS THE
INCOME TAX. "1

INTRODUCTION

April 1 5 th is a day that many American citizens approach with
a feeling of impending doom. Although it is also the day that the
*J.D. Candidate, May 2007, St. John's University School of Law; B.S. Science-Business,
University of Notre Dame, May 2003. The author wishes to thank Professor John
Davidian for his advice, encouragement, and insight throughout the preparation of this
Note.
1 Albert Einstein, quoted in MICHAEL JACKMAN, THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF BUSINESS
AND ECONOMIC QUOTATIONS 195 (Michael Jackman ed., Macmillan Publishing Company
1984).
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Titanic sank, chances are it more often comes to mind in another
context. On that day, the anguish of filing income tax returns is
felt across the country, and in most homes citizens express
complaints and dissatisfaction regarding some, if not many,
aspects of the taxation system. Amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code in 2006 evince changes that reflect the federal
government's response to a growing concern for the state of the
environment and the need for alternative sources of energy.
Nevertheless, there remain many other areas in which reform is
necessary. Recently, President Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform proposed several federal taxation reforms concerning
home ownership and the alternative minimum tax (hereinafter
"AMY'). An analysis of human behavior and preferences will
help legislators reach results that will satisfy the greatest
number of people, but it will require innovation and compromise.
This note begins with a general overview of the federal income
taxation system. Next, it explains the history and current state
of the law surrounding the home mortgage interest deduction
and the AMT. The next section of this note analyzes the changes
in these areas proposed by the tax panel and explores the
likelihood of their enactment. In addition, this note emphasizes
the importance of understanding the interaction between human
behavior and taxes when deciding tax policy. Finally, this note
offers proposals that aim to satisfy the interests of as many as
possible.
I. HISTORICAL SETTING AND BACKGROUND

A. CalculatingTax Liability - Follow the Yellow Brick Road
On February 25, 1913, the 16th Amendment was ratified,
giving Congress the "power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever sources derived.. ."2 As ironic as it may
currently seem, at the time the amendment was ratified, the
House Report stated that "all good citizens...will willingly and
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The amendment in its entirety provides:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.

Id.
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cheerfully support and sustain this, the fairest and cheapest of
all taxes." 3 The importance of the federal income tax cannot be
overemphasized as it is the most productive source of revenue for
the federal government. 4 In light of its prolific nature, Congress
has attempted to draft the tax system in a way that serves both
economic and social goals. 5 Contrary to how it may feel to
taxpayers, a pervasive theme of the federal income taxation
structure is fairness, evident in the tax system's focus on a
person's "ability to pay." 6 Many economists assert that the

structure of the federal income tax is the fairest of all taxes due
to its progressive nature. 7 In order to determine whether noneconomist citizens would agree with this statement, it is
important to understand how the income tax system operates.
The basic structure of the federal income tax requires
taxpayers to first total their income for the appropriate taxable
year from whatever source derived, i.e. from all taxable sources. 8
Next, taxpayers can subtract applicable deductions, resulting in
3 RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 2 (Revised Ed., The Brookings

Institution 1976) (quoting House Report 5, 63 Cong. (1st Sess. 1913)).
4 See GOODE, supra note 3, at 4 (commenting on importance of individual income tax
to federal government); see also JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 63 (5th ed.,
The Brookings Institution 1987) (noting that individual income tax is extremely lucrative
in democratic countries because of ability to pay).
5 See Henry J. Aaron & Joseph A. Pechman, Introduction and Summary to How
TAXES AFFECT ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 1 (5th ed. 1981) (highlighting various areas in which
taxes are used to influence behavior including stock market, savings, and charitable
giving); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing goals of taxation, including use
of tax policy as an instrument to promote economic growth and efficiency as well as an
instrument to reallocate resources as necessary).
6 "Ability to pay" is understood as a sort of economic well-being that approximates
taxpayers' financial resources and ranks them accordingly. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY
PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX
AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 30 (Nov. 2005), available at http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/final-

report/ [hereinafter REPORT]. Ability to pay in its most basic form refers to whether or not
citizens have the resources to pay taxes. See GOODE, supra note 3, at 17. A more broad
understanding would encompass the degree to which one would suffer financially in
meeting his/her tax obligations. See id. "Ability to pay" can also be associated with the
close connection between a person's income and his/her capacity to pay taxes. See
PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 63.
7 See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006) (outlining categories of taxpayers and depicting
progressive tax rates within each category); see also GOODE, supra note 3, at 292
(addressing several characteristics of federal income tax system that contribute to its
fairness, such as its flexibility to respond to changes in employment and production);
PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 133 (emphasizing importance and fairness of tax and
highlighting its flexibility).
8 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (including wages, compensation, interest, dividends,
capital gains or loss, business income or loss, pensions, farm income, rents, etc., in tax
base); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 64 (explaining first step for taxpayers is to sum
their income from all taxable sources).
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a subtotal that is referred to as adjusted gross income. 9
Taxpayers then subtract personal exemptions which apply to
themselves and their dependents.O At this point, taxpayers
determine whether to itemize their deductions or to take the
standard deduction.11 Once taxpayers subtract the appropriate
deduction, they have determined their taxable income, 12 the
amount to which the applicable tax rates are applied.13 The
resulting value at this point is the regular tax liability.14 After
determining their tax liability, taxpayers can subtract tax
credits, i.e. dollar for dollar reductions that may be available.15
Taxpayers then have to determine possible AMT tax liability
using the alternative minimum taxable income calculations.1 6 If
applicable, taxpayers must then pay any tentative AMT liability
in excess of regular tax liability.17
9 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (referring to these deductions as "above-the-line"
deductions); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 65 (naming several above-the-line
deductions which include payments into self-employment and individual retirement
accounts and alimony).
10 See generally I.R.C. § 151 (West 2006) (allowing deduction for personal exemptions
which are phased out as adjusted gross income exceeds applicable threshold amount
provided in statute); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing justification for
personal exemptions and ramifications of taxing people "below minimum levels of
subsistence").
11 See I.R.C. § 63(d) (West 2006) (defining itemized deductions as those deductions
allowable under Code other than above-the-line deductions and deduction for personal
exemptions); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (noting that taxpayer will want to
choose larger of two deductions).
12 See I.R.C. § 63(a) (West 2006) (explaining taxable income as adjusted gross income
minus standard deduction or itemized deductions and minus deduction for personal
exemptions); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 65 (affirming that taxable income is
computed by calculating two sets of deductions).
13 See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006) (delineating applicable tax rates for each taxpayer based
on graduated system); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (emphasizing that tax rates
differ based upon taxpayer's filing status and character of income).
14 See I.R.C. § 55 (West 2006) (referring to AMT as tax equal to excess of tentative
minimum tax over regular tax liability); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 24
(distinguishing regular tax liability from AMT liability).
15 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 25A (West 2006) (providing Hope and Lifetime Learning credits
for qualified tuition and related expenses); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 26
(analogizing tax credit to coupon at supermarket because it is applied after taxpayer's tax
liability is calculated).
16 See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(summarizing briefly alternative minimum tax calculations required under I.R.C. §§ 5558); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 24 (mentioning that alternative minimum tax
requires taxpayer to start tax liability calculations over but this time using alternative
minimum tax base to start).
17 See Ventas, 381 F.3d at 1158 (affirming that if tentative minimum tax exceeds
regular tax liability, then taxpayer is required to pay this AMT liability in addition to
his/her regular tax liability); see also Stewart S. Karlinsky, A Report on Reforming the
Alternative Minimum Tax System, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 139, 149 (1995) (confirming that
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B. The Need for Reform of the Tax System as a Whole - Maybe the
Wizard Can Help
Many Americans find the task of calculating their income tax
liability a bit daunting, what with trying to choose between a
1040, 1040A, or 1040EZ form for example or deciding whether or
not to e-file.1S In fact, economists, financiers, and politicians are
expressing their disdain for the complexity of the tax system.19
Perhaps Steve Forbes summarized the situation best when he
testified before the President's Advisory Panel prior to the
release of its recommendations by stating:
There isn't a human being alive who knows what's contained
in the federal tax code. To put it in perspective: Abraham
Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, which defined the American
nation, is 272 words in length. Our Declaration of
Independence is some 1,300 words. The Bible, which spans
several thousands of years of human history, is 773,000
words. But the federal tax code, with all of its attendant
rules and regulations, is 9 million words and rising. 2 0
Not only is the content of the Code complex, but there has been
a significant increase in the amount of time required for tax
preparation in order to adequately comply with its many
idiosyncrasies.21 The current tax system is undoubtedly more
complex than necessary, and yet it is important to remember
that tax systems by their very nature are inherently intricate

taxpayers whose tentative alternative minimum tax liability exceeds their regular tax
liability must pay this excess amount in addition to paying their regular tax liability).
18 See 152 CONG. REC. 19, S1323 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
(commenting on mental, mathematical, and manual gymnastics in which taxpayers must
engage to accomplish the task of filling out appropriate tax form); Dan T. Coenen,
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 992 n.136
(1998) (indicating difficulty Americans face in attempting to fill out their tax forms as well
as complexity of tax system as whole).
19 See 152 CONG. REC. 19, S1323 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
(depicting need for tax reform, especially in area of alternative minimum tax); see also
Steve Forbes, Steve Forbes Testifies Before the President'sAdvisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform, FORBES, June 6, 2005, at 31 (highlighting Forbes' concern over complexity of
federal tax code).
20 Forbes, supra note 19, at 31.
21 See 152 CONG. REC. 19, S1323 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
(estimating that in 2006, $140 million will be spent on tax preparation); see also Forbes,
supra note 19, at 31 (stressing that Americans spent 6.6 billion hours preparing their tax
forms in 2005).
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and thus difficult to understand. 2 2 Changes in one area of the tax
code have ramifications in many other areas, often unintended. 23
The President's Advisory Panel was well aware of this unsettling
complexity
when
it
assumed
the task
of drafting
recommendations. 24 The Panel's proposals encompass two
separate plans, but for purposes of this paper it is only important
to note that under both, the proposed treatment of the home
mortgage interest deduction and the alternative minimum tax
25
are the same.
C. History of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and Current
State of the Law - Click Your Heels Three Times
Since 1913, taxpayers have been able to deduct the interest
they pay on their home mortgage through one tax provision or
another. 2 6 Over time, the home mortgage interest deduction has
served to further increase the tax benefits that are conferred
upon those who choose to become homeowners. 2 7 As a result, this
22 See Coenen, supra note 18, at 992 n.136 (affirming inherent complexity of tax
systems); see also John S. Nolan, The Erwin N. Griswold Lecture: The Merit of an Income
Tax Versus a Consumption Tax, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 207, 212 (1995) (referring to how
existing income tax system has become far more complex than necessary).
23 See GOODE, supra note 3, at 9 (mentioning that decisions regarding tax policy
should take into account not only the consequences changes in tax policy could have on
other taxes but also on the budget and government expenditures); see also DANIEL
SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION
RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 1-11 (William M. Landes & J. Mark Ramseyer eds.,
University of Chicago Press 2000) (discussing how changes in tax policy and other
political areas often have retroactive effects).
24 See REPORT, supra note 6, at xiii (discussing the task that they as Panel faced and
admitting that the tax system is complex, unstable, and unpredictable); see also Samuel
L. Braunstein & Carol F. Burger, Tax Reform Panel Offers Sweeping Changes, THE
NATIONAL PULSE, 4 NO. 50 A.B.A. J. E-Report 5 (Dec. 16, 2005) (analyzing the two plans
that the Panel proposed, mentioning how Panel could not discuss all aspects relating to
the tax system such as payroll taxes or excise taxes, and suggesting that if the
recommendations become law there would be major changes and ramifications).
25 See REPORT, supra note 6, at xvii (depicting how under both the Simplified Income
Tax Plan and the Growth and Investment Plan, treatment of alternative minimum tax
and home mortgage interest deduction is the same); Braunstein & Burger, supra note 24
(stating that both plans are substantially identical with regard to individuals).
26 The tax code currently allows taxpayers to deduct interest on up to $1.1 million
when the debt is secured by a residence. See I.R.C. § 163 (h)(B)(i) (West 2006). The
individual income tax in 1913 allowed a deduction for all interest payments, thus
encompassing the home mortgage interest deduction. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So)
Little House on the Prairie:The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1351-52 (2000).
27 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 70 (mentioning provisions in Code in addition to the
home mortgage interest deduction that benefit homeowners, such as the ability to deduct
state and local property taxes and to exclude some or all of the capital gain on the sale of
a primary residence); see also John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation,
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deduction has served as an incentive to take advantage of a
significant tax break by seeking to buy a home. 28 As purchasing a
home is a costly undertaking, it is usually the wealthier
segments of society who choose to embark on this feat, and thus
the home mortgage interest deduction has predominantly been
understood as a benefit primarily available for the wealthy.2 9
However, with the availability of numerous banks and mortgage
companies, it has become easier to find a willing lender and
many people have decided to take advantage of the deduction. 3 0
In fact, it is likely that "the home mortgage interest deduction is
America's favorite itemized deduction." 3 1
In order to appreciate its attractiveness, one must understand
how the home mortgage interest deduction operates. Under
section 163 of the Internal Revenue Code, a taxpayer can take a
deduction for qualified residence interest. 32 A qualified residence
includes a taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence
selected by the taxpayer. 3 3 Qualified residence interest is the
interest paid on either acquisition indebtedness or home equity
indebtedness. 34 Acquisition indebtedness is the debt which is
secured by the residence and is incurred in acquiring,
55 ARK. L. REV. 1, 32-35 (2002) (referring to tax benefits conferred upon those who occupy
their principal residences, including the home mortgage interest deduction and the
deductibility of state and local real property taxes).
28 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MOVING TO AMERICA - MOVING TO HOMEOWNERSHIP:
1994-2002, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housinghvs/
movingtoamerica2002/ownfigl.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (displaying a steady
increase in home ownership from 1994 to 2002); see also Home Ownership Highest in
Midwest, South, REALTOR MAGAZINE, availableat http://www.realtor.org/
rmodaily.nsf/0/c4f4133alee845d6862570fc0057lb62?OpenDocument,
(citing
David
Bradley of the BRANDENTON HERALD stating that the national homeownership rate
jumped to 69.1 percent in 2004 from 55 percent in 1950).
29 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (portraying a graph that demonstrates a direct
relationship between tax benefits per return and adjusted gross income); see also Sharon
C. Nantell, A Cultural Perspective on American Tax Policy, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 33, 67 (1999)
(stating that "[t]ax provisions such as the home mortgage interest deduction and the
preferential tax treatment of capital gains primarily benefit taxpayers in the upperincome brackets").
30 The number of American homeowners increased from 55 percent in 1950 to 66.2
percent in 2000. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES:
HOMEOWNERSHIP, availableat http://www.census.govhhes/wwwhousing/census/
historic/owner.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). Mortgage service providers such as
Ditech go so far as to allow potential home buyers to be pre-approved for real estate loans
over the Internet. See Ditech Home Page, http://www.ditech.com (last visited Nov. 22,
2006).
31 Mann, supra note 26, at 1348.
32 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 2006).
33 I.R.C. § 163(h)(4) (West 2006).
34 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A) (West 2006).
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constructing, or substantially improving any qualified residence
of the taxpayer. 3 5 A taxpayer can deduct interest on acquisition
debt with a principal amount of up to one million dollars. 36 Home
equity indebtedness is debt which is secured by the qualified
residence to the extent that the aggregate amount of the debt
does not exceed the fair market value of the qualified residence
reduced by the amount of acquisition indebtedness on the
residence. 3 7 A taxpayer can deduct interest on up to one-hundred
thousand dollars home equity debt and can use the loan proceeds
for any purpose, so long as the loan is secured by a qualified
residence. 3 8 As a result, a taxpayer can deduct interest on one
million dollars of acquisition indebtedness and interest on onehundred thousand dollars of home equity indebtedness. 39 In
effect, a "taxpayer may reduce his tax liability by paying [his]
home mortgage interest."40
D. History of the Alternative Minimum Tax and Current State of
the Law - I'll Get You, My Pretty
Just this year, Senator Ron Wyden referred to the AMT as a
"crushing tax for millions of middle-income people."41 In 2006,
this does not seem like an odd statement since the AMT is widely
known to be a thorn in the side of middle-America.4 2 However, at
the time of its enactment, the AMT was intended to target the
truly affluent portions of society.43 In 1969, Congress enacted an
35 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B) (West 2006).
36 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (West 2006).
37 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C) (West 2006).
38 I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (West 2006).
39 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (noting that qualified residence interest which is paid or
accrued during taxable year on acquisition indebtedness or home equity indebtedness is
deductible within the appropriate limits); see also Uslu v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1376 (T.C. 1997) (explaining the operations of I.R.C. § 163(h));
see also Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676, 685-86 (2005)
(stating that even though a taxpayer can "reduce his tax liability by paying his mortgage
interest,... that entitlement does not render the taxable event anything other than the
receipt of income by the taxpayer").
40 Wagnon, 126 S. Ct. at 685.
41 152 CONG. REC. 19, S1323 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
42 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 (branding the alternative minimum tax as a
"complex, unfair, and inefficient burden on millions of Americans."); see also Janet
Novack, Tax Planning in the Dark, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 12 (noting that millions of
Americans are currently "menaced by the Alternative Minimum Tax.").
43 The AMT as it is known today first came into effect in 1982, and the threshold for
liability was set at $40,000, which would equate to $82,000 today when adjusted for
inflation. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. Government felt that people who could take
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individual add-on minimum tax because it had determined that
in the preceding years, many wealthier taxpayers had not paid
any federal income tax. 44 In light of the underlying policy of
ability to pay, Congress took action and chose to implement the
minimum tax system which was targeted at the wealthy.45 The
minimum tax that was initiated in 1969 went through several
changes over the years until 1986 when the current AMT system
was established. 4 6 Because the AMT has not been properly
adjusted for inflation,47 it now serves to plague larger than
intended sections of society, including the twenty-one million
taxpayers who were affected by it this year. 48
In order to empathize with those who detest the AMT, it is
necessary to understand how it operates. It is easiest to start

advantage of favored tax treatment through certain transactions should be kept in check
by ensuring that they paid at least a minimum tax. See Karlinsky, supranote 17, at 141.
44 See Edwin S. Cohen, ATPI Roundtable on the Alternative Minimum Tax: An
Opening Overview, 12 AM. J. TAX POLY 133, 135 (1995) (remarking that one of the original
goals of the minimum tax was to eliminate the possibility of persons with adjusted gross
incomes over $200,000 paying no federal income tax); Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 140
(stating that the "genesis" of the 1969 tax was that 155 individual taxpayers with
adjusted gross incomes over $200,000 had not paid federal income tax in 1967).
45 BOB ERICKSON, THE ABC'S OF THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, IRS 2005
NATIONWIDE TAX FORUM (June 28, 2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/sectionOl-abcsoftheamt.pdf (stating that Congress enacted the minimum tax to
"ensure high-income individuals would not escape payment of tax by using tax
preferences"); see GOODE, supra note 3, at 18 (noting that the ability-to-pay policy is
appealing because even critics of the policy agree that "people with income below a certain
level should not be expected to pay taxes"); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 209
(asserting that in context of income taxes, the measure of one's ability to pay is income,
thus it follows that those with more income have a better ability to pay).
46 See ERICKSON, supra note 45 (delineating the history of the AMT); Karlinsky,
supra note 17, at 140-47 (tracking history of AMT); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at
128 (noting that the 1969 add-on tax was replaced by alternative minimum tax in 1983).
47 See Albert B. Crenshaw, America Runs on AMT, THE WASH. POST, May 29, 2005, at
F01 (discussing how the AMT was not adjusted for inflation); Perry Bacon, Jr., Costly
Alternatives, TIME, Dec. 19, 2005, at 26 ("The AMT is not adjusted for inflation, and recent
cuts have lowered rates under the traditional tax code, making many middle-class people
subject to the AMT."); Press Release by Rep. Philip English, House Passes Bill to Preserve
Tax Cuts for America's Middle Class Families,U.S. FED. NEWS (Dec. 7, 2005), availableat
http://www.house.gov/list/press/paO3english/amtl2O5.html
(noting that the "dollar
amount triggering the AMT rate was never adjusted for inflation, so more and more
individuals are being subject to the AMT").
48 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing the projected 21.6 million tax payers to
be affected by the AMT in 2006, and estimating that it will affect 52 million taxpayers in
2015); see also Linda Sugin, Sustaining Progressivity in the Budget Process: Commentary
on Gale & Orszag's An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy in the Bush Administration,
2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1259, 1271-74 (2004) (commenting on the importance of
indexing the AMT for inflation in conjunction with other aspects of the system that need
to be overhauled).
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with calculating alternative minimum taxable income. 4 9
Alternative minimum taxable income is the taxable income of the
taxpayer for the taxable year that is determined with
adjustments in sections 56 and 58 of the Internal Revenue Code,
and increased by the amount of tax preferences in section 57.50
Sections 56 and 58 require taxpayers to treat certain property
differently than they would under their regular tax calculation.51
For example, alternative minimum taxable income, unlike
regular taxable income, does not allow for any miscellaneous
itemized deductions.5 2 These two sections primarily serve to
lessen the benefits of which the taxpayers can take advantage. 5 3
Section 55 requires the taxpayer to increase her alternative
minimum taxable income by the amount of the items listed in
section 57.54 Once the taxpayer has determined the amount of
her alternative minimum taxable income, she needs to determine
the exemption amount.5 5 The exemption amount is a figure
provided in section 55(d), which varies depending upon the status
of the taxpayer, e.g. whether the taxpayer is filing jointly or
perhaps is married but filing separately. 5 6 The taxpayer can
determine whether she has a taxable excess, which means the
49 See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2) (West 2006) (defining alternative minimum taxable income
and providing the sections of the internal revenue code which are necessary for its
determination).
50 See id. (listing sections 56, 57 and 58 as those sections necessary to determine one's
alternative minimum taxable income and describing how they apply).
51 See I.R.C. § 56(a) (West 2006) (stating that the adjustments in § 56 are used to
determine the amount of the alternative minimum taxable income in lieu of the treatment
applicable for purposes of computing the regular tax); I.R.C. § 58 (West 2006) (specifying
the denial of certain losses).
52 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (West 2006) ("In determining the amount of the
alternative minimum taxable income of any taxpayer ... the following treatment shall
apply... : [n]o deductions shall be allowed for any miscellaneous itemized deduction").
53 See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C)(iv) (West 2006) (stating it does not allow for the deduction
of interest incurred on home equity indebtedness); I.R.C. § 58 (explaining denial of
specified losses).
54 See I.R.C. § 55(b)(2)(B) (West 2006) (requiring the items of tax preference described
in § 57 to be added to the alternative minimum taxable income); Ventas, Inc. v. United
States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining AMT calculations and stating
that items in § 57 serve to increase the amount of the alternative minimum taxable
income for the year).
55 See Alternative Minimum Tax, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and
IRS Oversight, S. Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. 5 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement
of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/ntawrittentestimonyfcO52305amt.pdf(describing an eight step process for calculating
AMT liability); see also I.R.C. § 55(d) (requiring taxpayer to calculate his/her exemption
amount).
56 See I.R.C. § 55(d) (West 2006) (listing options for single and joint returns under the
"exemption amount" category).
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amount (if any) of the alternative minimum taxable income that
exceeds the exemption amount. 57 At this point, the taxpayer
must calculate the tentative minimum tax, which is the sum of
26% of the taxable excess up to $175,000 and 28% of the taxable
excess over $175,000.58 Finally, section 55(a) of the Code lays out
the general rule that if there is an excess of the tentative
minimum tax for the taxable year over the regular tax for the
taxable year, then there will be a tax imposed that is equal to the
amount of such excess. 5 9 Remembering that this calculation is in
addition to the regular tax calculation, one begins to understand
the frustration that many taxpayers experience every year. 6 0
As the Code does provide for several deductions and/or credits
for certain expenses based on consumer preferences, there are
often several ways for taxpayers to benefit and reduce their tax
liability.6 1 However, because the government relies so heavily on
the revenue from the income tax,6 2 it seeks to ensure that these
people who do take advantage of the tax preferences still
contribute to this revenue pool. 63 Some argue that the deductions
57 See Hearing,supra note 55, at 6 (noting the taxpayer must compute his/her taxable
excess after calculating the exemption amount); see also I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(ii) (West
2006) (defining taxable excess).
58 See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) (West 2006); see also Hearing, supra note 55, at 6
(noting computation of the tentative minimum tax as the step after calculating taxable
excess).
59 See I.R.C. § 55(a) (West 2006); see also Hearing, supra note 55, at 6 (explaining
that the AMT is equal to the excess of the taxpayer's tentative minimum tax, if any, over
his regular tax liability).
60 See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming
that if tentative minimum tax exceeds regular tax liability, then taxpayers are required to
pay this AMT liability in addition to his or her regular tax liability); see also Karlinsky,
supra note 17, at 149 (asserting that taxpayers must pay any tentative alternative
minimum tax liability that exceeds their regular tax liability).
61 See Hearing, supra note 55, at 9 (stating that Congress wants to preserve taxfavored capital gains treatment under the "AMT regime" and that capital gains are taxed
for regular tax purposes at lower rates than the AMT rates); Katie Brenner, Alternative
Minimum Tax 101 (Nov. 10, 2005), http://money.cnn.com/2005/11/09/pf/taxes/
amt_101/index.htm (discussing the different rules for AMT deductions, and explaining
that some deductions, including mortgage-interest and charitable donations, still stand).
62 See I.R.S Educ. Fact Sheet: Taxes, Economics of Taxation, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/education/fact.sheets/taxes/economics.shtml
(stating the federal
government "relies mainly on income taxes for its revenue"); U.S. Gov. Accountability
Office, Individual Income Tax Policy, Streamlining, Simplification, and Additional
Reforms are Desirable, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061028t.pdf ('"The individual
income tax has long been the largest source of federal revenue - amounting to $927 billion
(7.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) in 2005.").
63 The purpose of the AMT is to ensure that "no taxpayer with substantial economic
income [is] able to avoid all tax liability by using exclusions, deductions, and credits."
Ventas, Inc., 57 Fed. Cl. at 412 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97-494, at 108 (1982)). The "floor
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that are disallowed today include preferences that the AMT was
originally not designed to limit. 64 As a result, the AMT structure
is unfairly denying taxpayers access to the benefits which the
regular tax system provides. 65 Courts have made clear that it is
not their responsibility but rather the onerous duty of Congress
66
to make the necessary changes.
II. EXPLANATION OF THE TAX ADVISORY PANEL'S PROPOSED
CHANGES

A. Proposed Changes for the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction Hang on to Your Ruby Slippers, Dorothy
When examining the current state of the tax system, the
President's Advisory Panel noted that the deduction for home
mortgage interest was available only to those taxpayers who
chose to itemize their deductions, as opposed to taking the
standard deduction. 67 The Panel suggests removing the home
mortgage interest deduction and replacing it with a Home
Credit. 68 The Home Credit would be equal to 15% of mortgage
concept" of the AMT serves to prevent a profitable taxpayer from reducing his/her tax
liability below that floor amount. See Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 146.
64 See Cohen, supra note 44, at 136 (referring to denial under AMT of deduction for
miscellaneous itemized deductions and state and local property and income taxes, which
he claims were not originally intended under AMT); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at
129 (mentioning deficiencies of AMT system and how it does not follow underlying
progressive nature of regular tax system).
65 For instance, taxpayers can deduct interest on home equity indebtedness under the
regular tax system, but not under the AMT system. See I.R.C. § 56(e) (2006).
Furthermore, only those taxpayers who qualify for the home mortgage interest deduction
typically choose to take advantage of the other itemized deductions, such as the deduction
for state and local property taxes, thereby limiting the benefits of these deductions to the
wealthier individuals in society. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
66 See Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 274 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating
that "Congress, not [the] court, must correct any shortcomings in the AMT's application");
see also Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Comm'r, 98 F.3d 194, 201-202 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing
treatment of dividends for AMT purposes, remarking that any changes to calculations are
a matter for Congress and not the courts).
67 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (commenting on how typically taxpayers who
itemize tend to be in higher-income groups); see also I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006) (falling under
category of itemized deductions, home mortgage interest can only be usefully deducted
when taxpayers opt to itemize as opposed to taking standard deduction).
68 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73 (emphasizing availability to all taxpayers as
important feature of proposed Home Credit); see generally Jeff Schnepper, At Risk: Your
Home-Mortgage Deduction, MSN MONEY (Nov. 2, 2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com/
content/Taxes/P131174.asp (analyzing likelihood of Panel's proposals being enacted into
law).
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interest paid and it would thus be available to all taxpayers as a
credit whereas the current deduction is not. 6 9 In addition,
7
instead of the $1.1 million maximum limit currently in place, 0
the mortgage limit from which the 15% interest credit could be
7
taken would be limited to the average regional price of housing. 1
The Panel's suggested limits would be county-based and range
from $227,000 to $412,000.72 Furthermore, the Panel
recommends completely eliminating the deductions for interest
on mortgages on second homes and on home-equity loans. 73
In arriving at its recommendations, the Panel analyzed the tax
benefits the housing sector currently receives under the Code.74
Supporters of the Panel's proposal argue that the Code is
encouraging home ownership at the expense of investments in
the business sector, which causes an adverse impact on society by
decreasing productivity in the workplace. 75 Others point out that
69 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73-74 (noting driving force behind transition to a
Home Credit is to make home ownership available to more Americans); see also
Schnepper, supra note 68 (analyzing advantages and disadvantages transition to a credit
would have depending upon which tax bracket particular taxpayers fall under).
70 See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006) (placing $1,000,000 limitation on amount of acquisition
indebtedness and $100,000 limitation on amount of home equity indebtedness that can
qualify for interest deductions); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 70 (discussing housing
tax benefits under current law and stating in particular that "[t]axpayers are allowed to
deduct interest paid on up to $1 million of mortgage debt secured by the taxpayer's first or
second home" and that "homeowners may deduct interest on home equity loans of up to
$100,000.").
71 The Panel explained that the Home Credit limit would be based on the average
cost of housing within the taxpayer's geographic area. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73.
The average cost of housing would be determined using data from the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). See id. Analysts have expressed skepticism about this approach as
it may end up causing more complexity than simplicity. See Schnepper, supra note 68. It
may be more inconvenient and confusing to require separate limits for each county that
would have to be recalculated annually. See id.
72 See REPORT, supra note 6, at xvii (noting that taxpayers with mortgages above
maximum limit could utilize credit on value of loan up to that amount).
73 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73 (specifying changes that would be made regarding
home mortgage interest deduction and recommending elimination of preferential
treatment given to interest paid on second home mortgages and home equity
indebtedness); see also Schnepper, supra note 68 (affirming that Panel would eliminate
deduction for interest payments on home-equity loans as well as on second home
mortgages).
74 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 70 (referring to Code provisions in addition to home
mortgage interest deduction that benefit homeowners, such as deductions for state and
local property taxes and exclusions for some or all capital gain on sale of a primary
residence); Mann, supra note 26, at 1348-49 (describing how taxation supports the
American Dream through "the home mortgage interest deduction, the property tax
deduction, and the exclusion of imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing").
75 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 71 (positing that perhaps higher rate of tax on
business investment leads to proportionately less investment in business, causing domino
effect on equipment and technologies industries); see also Andrew Chamberlain, The Case
Against the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, THE TAX FOUNDATION, Sept. 24, 2005,
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the benefits conferred on home ownership unfairly discriminate
against renters. 7 6 Supporters also emphasize that limiting the
deduction would provide a large amount of revenue to the federal
government, considering that taxpayers claim hundreds of
billions of dollars in home mortgage interest deductions each
year. 7 7 In addition, although encouraging home ownership
supports the notion of the American Dream, some argue that it
has only served to increase the prices of homes, making the
dream harder to attain. 78 The Panel suggests that the Code
should aim to support home ownership, not necessarily
ownership of luxury homes or boats that could be considered
residential. 79 Furthermore, it is typically the wealthier in society
who are able to take advantage of the home mortgage interest
deduction as a product of foregoing the standard deduction and
itemizing.8 0 As a result, it is only those taxpayers who are able to

available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/1081.html (supporting elimination of
home mortgage interest deduction because of its negative impact on assets such as
factories and equipment that are more productive and benefit more aspects of society,
including workers and wages).
76 See JOSHUA E. GREENE, THE TAX TREATMENT OF HOMEOWNERSHIP: ISSUES AND
OPTIONS xii (Cong. Budget Office 1981), microformed on CIS No. 81-J932-33 (Cong. Info.
Serv.) (summarizing effect on rental housing due to lower after-tax costs of home
ownership); see also Home Mortgage Deduction Under Attack By Presidential Panel,
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY, availableat http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com
10242005_HomeMortgageInterestDeduction.asp
(last visited Nov. 12,
2006)
[hereinafter Under Attack] (contrasting arguments for and against Panel's proposal and
noting that those who support elimination of home mortgage interest deduction
emphasize its current discrimination against renters).
77 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (connecting elimination of AMT with limitation on
deduction for home mortgage interest, and noting that in order to allow for elimination of
AMT, government would need to obtain this lost revenue from somewhere such as from
revenue home mortgage interest limitation would provide); see also Under Attack, supra
note 76 (positing that elimination or at least limitation of the current home mortgage
interest deduction would generate much needed revenue for the federal government).
78 Median home values adjusted for inflation nearly quadrupled from 1940 to 2000.
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES: HOME VALUES,
available at http://www.census.govlhhes/wwwlhousing/censuslhistoric/values.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006). The average price of a home in the United States in 2000 was
$119,600, whereas in 1940 it was $30,600. See id. Increasing housing costs have caused
problems for those whose incomes do not rise as well. See Mann, supra note 26, at 136768.
79 See I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006) (allowing for deduction of interest on qualified second
residence, which could even include a boat if it is residential); see also REPORT, supra note
6, at 73 (suggesting that Home Credit would serve society better because it would
encourage home ownership, not necessarily ownership of luxury or vacation homes).
80 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (noting that wealthier taxpayers tend to be the
ones who itemize and the value of a deduction is worth more to a taxpayer in a higher
income bracket); see also Mann, supra note 26, at 1362 (asserting that benefits of home
mortgage interest deduction will continue to favor the wealthy).

2007 ]

THERE'SNOPLACE LIKE HOME

itemize that receive the advantages, thereby barring the lower
income taxpayers from partaking in these benefits as well. 8 '
On the other hand, supporters of retaining the current home
mortgage interest deduction have not responded well to the
Panel's recommendations. 8 2 It is possible that home ownership
would be significantly discouraged and consumer spending would
decrease.8 3 Moreover, the Panel's suggested regional limits will
most likely prevent residents of wealthier areas to fully deduct
interest payments on the mortgage they would need in order to
purchase a home because the housing prices would be well above
the suggested limit.8 4 Even a home that was considered average
in price might be over the limit, thus the middle-income taxpayer
85
would be adversely affected as well as the affluent.
Organizations such as the National Association of Realtors have
written to the Panel expressing their dissatisfaction with the
81 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 (affirming that many deductions under regular tax
system are not available under AMT system); Mann, supra note 26, at 1365 (indicating
that home mortgage interest deduction not only favors the wealthy but also discriminates
against minorities as they are typically less likely to partake in those activities that
receive tax preferences).
82 See Mann, supra note 26, at 1348 (predicting that if Congress suggested a repeal of
the home mortgage interest deduction there would be "howls of protest from all
quarters"); see also National Association of Realtors, Defending the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, availableat http://www.realtor.org/government affairs/mortgageinterestdeduction/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Defending]
(expressing concern for housing industry if home mortgage interest deduction were
repealed).
83 See Defending, supra note 82 (warning that even the mere mention of reducing tax
benefits available for home ownership could cause property values to decline, especially in
high cost areas); see also Under Attack, supra note 76 (expressing dissenters' concerns
that proposal could hurt economy by causing decline in consumer spending).
84 See UnderAttack, supra note 76 (noting that residents of high-priced markets such
as New York and San Francisco might not be able to adequately deduct interest payments
on high mortgage that they would require if the current average limits were used as a
available at
NEWSDAY,
Values,
Census: Home
also 2000
see
guide);
http://www.newsday.combusiness/realestate/ny-census-homevaluesearch.cdbresult?
PageURL=ny-census-homevaluesearch.cdbresult&Lib=turbine cdb lib%3Aresultdoc
_id+result doc rank+document id+cdb num+cdb 01 txt+cdb 02 txt+cdb 03 txt+cdb_04
_txt+cdb 05 txt+cdb_06_txt+cdb_07_txt+cdb_08_txt+cdb_09_txt+cdb_10_txt+cdb_11_txt+
cdb 12 txt+cdb_13_txt+cdb_14_txt+cdb_15_txt+cdb_16_txt+cdb 17 txt+cdb_18_txt+cdb_
19_txt+cdb 20txt&SortBy=COMPOSITERANK+desc%2C+cdb. 02 txt&PageSize=50&P
age=l&MinCoarseRank=500&QueryType=CONCEPT&turbine cdb libcdb02txt=nass
au+county (last visited Nov. 14, 2006) (referring to a 2000 census depicting home values
that vary in Nassau County, Long Island, which would indicate that significant numbers
of people would be above the average limit set for the county, and thus unable to make
total use of the Home Credit).
85 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 74 (highlighting that under the proposed Home
Credit, lower income taxpayers would do best, thus middle to upper would suffer); see also
UnderAttack, supra note 76 (noting that in high-priced areas, median priced homes could
be difficult to purchase and thus middle income families would suffer).
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proposal, and join with others arguing that the Panel's
recommendations would eliminate the pursuit of the American
Dream.8 6 In addition, current homeowners have relied upon the
existence of the home mortgage interest deduction in choosing to
purchase homes and argue that they may unfairly end up being
87
liable for more tax dollars than expected.

B. Proposed Changes for the AMT- It's a Twister! It's a Twister!
Apparently the Panel believes it is a time to drop a house on
the AMT, as its recommendation is to eliminate the AMT system
completely. 8 8 In reaching this recommendation, the Panel noted
the following flaws of the AMT: (i) it is not indexed for inflation,
(ii) it contains steep marriage penalties, and (iii) it does not
provide for an adjustment for family size because personal
exemptions are not allowed. 8 9 Not only would eliminating the
AMT allow millions of taxpayers to save tax dollars, but it would
also allow these same taxpayers to either save money in tax
preparation assistance or save themselves from needless
aggravation. 90
86 See Letter from Al Mansell, President of National Association of Realtors, to
Connie Mack & John Breaux, Chairman & Vice-Chairman of the President's Advisory
Panel on Tax Reform (Oct. 14, 2005), availableat http://www.realtor.orgl
government-affairs/mortgage-interest-deductiontax reform -letter.html (expressing his
concern on behalf of National Association of Realtors that changes to home mortgage
interest deduction must take into account the importance of home ownership in American
society as well as the fragility of the housing industry as a whole); see also Press Release,
Mortgage Bankers Association, MBA Opposes Tax Reform Proposals Impacting
Homeowners (Nov. 1, 2005), available at http://www.mortgagebankers.org/
NewsandMedialPressCenter/33174.htm (publicizing the Mortgage Bankers Association's
dissatisfaction with the Panel's proposed reforms).
87 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 238 (outlining the suggested five-year transition
period over which the deduction would phase out and the credit would phase in,
attempting to give taxpayers advance notice of the probable increase in their tax liability
due to their current mortgage payments).
88 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 85 (stating that its recommendation is to repeal the
AMT); see also Schnepper, supra note 68 (praising Panel's suggestion to eliminate the
AMT system entirely).
89 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining major negative aspects of AMT system
as compared to regular tax system); see also I.R.C. §§ 55-58 (West 2006) (explaining how
AMT system operates as its own parallel system of calculations and determinations that
are different from regular tax system).
90 See 152 CONG. REC. 19, S1323 (daily ed. Feb. 15, 2006) (statement of Sen. Wyden)
(joking on the complexity of AMT system and saying that "[i]f anybody who is not a CPA
can figure out the first line of the AMT, I urge them to call me"); see also REPORT, supra
note 6, at 86 (going through possible forms and worksheets a taxpayer may have to
comply with in order to calculate AMT liability).
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oppose
the Panel's
are
few who
Although there
recommendation to eliminate the AMT, there are several causes
for concern which must be examined. 9 1 Although the AMT
primarily serves as a giant headache for most, it provides
tremendous revenue for the federal government. 92 For the
government to accomplish the complete elimination of the AMT
in a revenue-neutral manner, it will need to recover this loss of
funds from other sources, which connects the fates of the AMT
and the home mortgage interest deduction. 9 3 The Panel realized
that the elimination of the AMT will hurt the federal government
and attempted to compensate for this loss with suggestions like
limiting the home mortgage interest deduction, which is designed
to raise revenue. 94 Although the proposed elimination of the
AMT is a step in the right direction, the Panel's
recommendations are not sufficiently taking into account the
values of current American society. 95 In order for Congress to
enact policies that will provide the greatest benefit to the
greatest number, it is necessary for the legislature to focus on
consumer behavior and the values that drive it.

91 It is important to note that the AMT is a large source of revenue which could alone
produce more funds in the next decade than the regular tax system. See REPORT, supra
note 6, at 87. Moreover, when discussing changes to the AMT system, it is important to
remember that the original policy goal behind it was to ensure that every taxpayer who
has the economic ability pays a certain minimum amount of tax. See Karlinsky, supra
note 17, at 150.
92 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 43 (estimating that AMT will generate over $1.2
trillion in tax revenue over the next ten years); see also Schnepper, supra note 68
(explaining that plans must be implemented to provide for the large amount of revenue
that will be lost if AMT is eliminated).
93 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 42 (realizing that preserving revenue neutrality
requires many uncertain projections about future policy and behavior); see also
Schnepper, supra note 68 (explaining that the Panel suggests limiting the deduction for
home mortgage interest because it needs tax dollars to pay for large cuts like the
elimination of the AMT).
94 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 74 (attempting to counteract the fact that taxpayers
would receive less of a tax subsidy with Home Credit by pointing out that they would no
longer have to pay tax under the AMT); see also Boat Owners Association, Tax Reform
Panel Proposes Major Change in Deductions, BOAT/U.S. MAG., Jan. 1, 2006, at 6(1)
(mentioning that current home mortgage interest deduction costs $69 billion annually).
95 See Nolan, supra note 22, at 210 (stating "Owner-occupied housing [is] the single
most important investment asset held by most Americans"); see also SHAVIRO, supra note
23, at 144 (referring to home mortgage interest deduction as "sacrosanct").
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III. LIKELIHOOD OF THE TAX PANEL'S SUGGESTED REFORMS
BEING EFFECTIVELY RECEIVED AND ENACTED

A. Examination of Consumer Behavior and Taxes - Are You a
Good Witch or a Bad Witch?
Although it is not something that people necessarily like to
admit, every society is stratified in some way, 9 6 for example,
American society can be broken down into various classes based
on level of income. 9 7 Max Weber, 9 8 a "classical sociological
thinker," distinguished class from status or prestige groups. 9 9
Weber viewed the significance of a class as being the "life
chances" that are given to an individual, i.e. the opportunities
that are bestowed upon a person because of his/her economic
situation in life.100 Also, according to Weber, people in similar
classes may not necessarily identify with each other.101 Instead,
the recognition of one's place occurs when individuals view
themselves according to a status or prestige group.O 2 The key
element of a prestige group is "the kind of lives they can lead as
consumers of goods and services, which reflect their prestige
96 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 49 (discussing significant growth in the inequality of
wealth in America); see also Harold Greenberg, Introduction to SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND
BEHAVIOR 315, 315 (Harold Greenberg ed., Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. 1971)
(asserting that there is no non-stratified modern society).
97 See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006) (outlining the various levels of income brackets within
each category of taxpayer); see also Linda M. Beale, Congress Fiddles While Middle
America Burns: Amending the AMT (and Regular Tax), 6 FLA. TAX REV. 811, 829 (2004)
(confirming the income disparity that continues to pervade American society).
98 For a brief but insightful biography on Maximilian Weber (1864-1920), considered
by many to be one of the founders of modern-day sociology, see The Concise Encyclopedia
of Economics, Max Weber, http://www.econlib.org/library/encbios/Weber.html (last visited
November 14, 2006).
99 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317 (distinguishing class from prestige groups in
Weber's view); see also Wikipedia, Max Weber, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MaxWeber
(last visited Nov. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Max Weber] (explaining Weber's analysis of "social
class [as] based on an economically determined relationship to the market[, i.e.] owner,
renter" whereas "status is based on non-economical qualities like honour [and] prestige").
100 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317 (discussing correlation between better
societal class and better 'life chances," regarding schools, health services, life expectancy,
etc.); Max Weber, supra note 99 (providing Weber's belief that one's social class, social
status, and political affiliation were consequential for his/her "life chances").
101 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317 (clarifying the distinguishing qualities of a
class versus a status group); Max Weber, supra note 99 (summarizing how Weber's idea of
status was "based on non-economical qualities like honour, prestige, and religion").
102 See Greenberg, supranote 96, at 317 (emphasizing the importance people place on
their status position in society and noting that people are "highly conscious" of this
position and know where they belong); see also Max Weber, supra note 99 (noting that the
status element of stratification focuses not only on prestige, but on honor as well).
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level."103 This status recognition, or "life style" as Weber noted
it,104 was one of the key components that Weber saw as
determining stratification in society.105
Even though the individuals that make up the various income
strata have very different personalities,10 6 Americans as a whole
tend to share some similar values and want to be accepted by
others. 107 Individuals often view themselves through the eyes of
others, placing an emphasis on the view others in society hold of
them.l0 8 Impacting on this perception is "the kind of lives
[individuals] can lead as consumers of goods and services, which
reflect their prestige level."10 9 Throughout all strata, the
economic source of power is the ownership of goods, because one's
level of income is often indicative of one's level of prestige or
status in society.110 Perhaps tax policy is best understood when
society is analyzed in terms of a stratification that organizes
individuals into status groups, focusing on a perception of
prestige."'
103 Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317.
104 See id. at 317-18.
105 See id. (noting that status, class, and party were the three distinct dimensions of
stratification in Weber's view); see also Max Weber, supra note 99 (affirming Weber's
three-component theory of stratification).
106 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317 (suggesting that, although individuals with
similar market positions possess similar life chances, it would be a mistake to assume
that those individuals have similar personalities); see also Max Weber, supra note 99
(finding no such relationship between an individual's economic status and personality).
107 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 64 (stating that "[e]very society has forms of
behavior which apply to all members as well as those reserved for particular members in
given situations"); see also Karin Scherner-Kim, The Role of the Oath of Renunciation in
Current U.S. Nationality Policy - to Enforce, to Omit, or Maybe to Change?, 88 GEO. L.J.
329, 343 (2000) (noting the definition of citizenship to include "a set of public values about
governance and law that are widely shared by those within it") (quoting Peter H. Schuck,
Plural Citizenship, in CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 217, 246-47 (1998)).
108 See Greenberg, supra note 96, at 320 (highlighting the relationship between
status and prestige); see also Francis E. Merrill, he Self and the Other: An Emerging
Field of Social Problems, in SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND BEHAVIOR 79, 80 (Harold
Greenberg ed., Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc. 1971) (suggesting the social self
aspect of each individual to be developed though his or her interactions with others, "as
the individual looks at himself through others' eyes").
109 Greenberg, supra note 96, at 317 (referring to Max Weber's analysis regarding
societal stratification).
110 See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY 57-58
(Martin Kessler Books ed., The Free Press 1995) (discussing the power of "positional
goods" in society); see also Max Weber, supra note 99, (declaring social class to be based
upon one's "economically determined relationship to the market").
111 Max Weber discussed the organization of society in such a way that individuals
are highly focused on their placement. See Max Weber, supra note 99. Status "is the
relative ranking of an individual in his society measured against all other individuals in
the society." See also Greenberg, supra note 96, at 320.
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B. The Importance of Saving - Auntie Em & Uncle Henry Would
Like to Retire
In order to be able to purchase goods, individuals must obtain
the necessary finances, which is often achieved through active
saving. It is almost impossible to empirically define how savings
and tax policy interact. 1 12 Nevertheless, many provisions in the
Code reflect the belief that having the capacity to save, and thus
choose to consume goods and services as desired, is vitally
important to American society at all levels.113 For example,
Congress has often attempted to structure the tax system in a
way that enables the poorer in society to keep their money, thus
making an effort to enable these individuals to raise themselves
up in the eyes of society.114 In addition, the structure of the Code
allows for deferral of some taxes in order to enable taxpayers to
take advantage of interest earned, by retaining that income for a
longer period of time. 1 15 However, not all taxpayers would agree
that the Code has been so accommodating.11 6 For instance, it is
frustrating for those taxpayers in the higher income brackets to
112 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 18 (referring to the analysis of savings
behavior in the United States as an "elusive" problem for economists); see also Arthur
Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical
Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D.L.REV. 8, 33 (2001) (asserting that impact of tax policy
on savings behavior to be unclear).
113 See I.R.C. § 1221 (West 2006) (allowing for preferential tax rate treatment on
capital gains); see also REPORT, supra note 6, at 114 (evidencing the Panel's recognition of
the importance of saving and its resulting search for ways of removing impediments to
saving).
114 See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006) (depicting a progressive tax rate structure allowing
lower rates to apply to lower income levels); see also U.S. Government Accountability
Office, Understandingthe Tax Reform Debate: Background, Criteria,and Questions, at 27
(Sep. 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d051009sp.pdf [hereinafter Tax
Reform Debate] (explaining how the ability to pay principle encompasses economic wellbeing); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 62-63 (discussing the progressive tax system in
light of the ability to pay principle and how tax rate structure factors the taxpayer's
context into its rate determinations).
115 There are entire websites devoted to educating taxpayers on ways to manipulate
the Code in order to find loopholes that allow for tax deferral. See Estate Street Partners,
LLC, Tax Strategies, http://www.taxdeferrals.comlstrategies.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2006). For example, IRA's are a useful vehicle for deferring taxes, because the Code allows
taxpayers to deduct the income that is placed into these accounts and thus not pay taxes
on them at that time. See Terry Savage, IRA's a Great Way to Save Money, Defer Taxes,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 2004, at 65.
116 See Marvin A. Chirelstein, The Day, Berry & Howard Visiting Scholar: Taxes and
Public Understanding,29 CONN. L. REV. 9, 9 (1996) (affirming the public hostility toward
the federal income tax system); see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rise of Rhetoric in
Tax Reform Debate: An Example, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2345, 2357-59 (1996) (examining studies
that have shown the progressive tax system to discourage taxpayers from saving, while
mentioning other studies that conclude differently).
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reconcile the importance of saving with the progressive nature of
the regular income tax system.1 i7 The progressive tax structure
causes those who have earned and saved more to pay a higher
rate of taxation. 1 18 This is one of the reasons that some
economists have lobbied for the advancement of a consumption
tax, which would tax people on the amount that they spend
rather than what they earn and attempt to save. Furthermore, it
is also difficult for taxpayers to accept the AMT because of its
adverse effect on the capacity to save. 1 19 The AMT does not
follow the progressive tax rate structure of the regular income
tax system, but rather functions as a separate tax over and above
what taxpayers must already pay, thus frustrating those who
have attempted to save throughout the year.12 0 Although these
circumstances reflect the underlying policy of ability to pay,
Congress needs to redraft these Code provisions to better
appease society. 12 1 For example, if Congress repealed the AMT,
many taxpayers would most likely complain less about their
ordinary tax rates, even if they were in the higher brackets,
because at least then they would not feel as though they were
being doubly burdened by the tax system.

117 See Cockfield, supra note 112, at 54 (portraying the view that progressive income
tax system is a "straight-out discrimination against the rich"); see also Susan Pace
Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-ChristianEthics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1,
47-48 (2002) (noting that the progressive income tax system tends to hinder the savings
incentives particularly for those in the higher income brackets).
118 See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006) (portraying higher tax rates for higher income
brackets); see also Ken Adelman, Not Real Simple, WASHINGTONIAN, Apr. 2006, at 33-37
(analyzing discord between progressive income tax system and saving).
119 See Beale, supra note 97, at 837 (explaining that the superrich have a larger
capacity to save just by the nature of their wealth, whereas lower income taxpayers
typically are forced to spend all of their after-tax savings; consequently, having to pay the
AMT liability further frustrates their efforts); see also James Lange & Glenn Venturino,
2002 Year-End Tax Planning Strategies, 4 LAWYERS J. 7, 14-15 (2002) (warning that
vulnerability to AMT can significantly decrease a taxpayer's savings).
120 See I.RC. § 55 (West 2006) (stating that AMT liability is the excess, if any, over
the regular tax liability); see also Daniel S. Goldberg, To Praise the AMT or To Bury It, 24
VA. TAX REV. 835, 840 (2005) (noting that the AMT system uses virtual flat tax rates as
opposed to progressive rates of regular tax system).
121 The ability to pay principle is the underlying rationale for both the progressive tax
system and the AMT because both were intended to ensure that taxpayers with a higher
economic well-being would bear the larger burden of providing tax funds. See Tax Reform
Debate, supra note 114, at 27. The purpose for which the AMT was enacted, i.e. ensuring
a tax system that was fair to all levels of society, was merit-worthy. See Goldberg, supra
note 120, at 839. However, the AMT has not yet progressed in form sufficient to satisfy its
original policy goal of making sure that the highest income taxpayers pay a fair share of
the income tax. See id.
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Another important aspect of saving is the value placed in
American society on the importance of saving today to plan for
the future, such as saving to provide for a child's education or for
retirement.122 Many taxpayers look to methods of achieving longterm economic growth by adequately managing their savings and
investment endeavors.12 3 "Income, education, and age" are three
of the most significant factors that influence whether consumers
have any long-term savings or investments.124 There is a direct
correlation between one's annual income and the likelihood that
one has some type of long-term investment. 12 5 In addition, more
choices are available for these taxpayers as there has been
significant growth in the quantity and quality of financial
planning options for individuals.12 6 For example, the 529 plan
has recently emerged which allows individuals to establish a
college fund for their children by setting aside funds for their
education.12 7 The Code in many respects has come to understand
122 See Office of Investor Education and Assistance of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, The Facts on Saving and Investing, at 7-8 (Apr. 1999), available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/report99.pdf (stating that "[e]xperts estimate that 55 to 64 percent
of Generation X have already begun to save for retirement, primarily because of 'the
prevalence of 401(k)s in the workplace today, which makes it easy for young people to
start saving for retirement, and concerns about the future of Social Security as a source of
retirement income"'); see also James Fanto, We're All CapitalistsNow: The Importance,
Nature, Provisionand Regulation of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 105, 148
(1998) (emphasizing the need to educate citizens on the importance of saving and
competent financial planning).
123 See Utilizations of Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings: An Update, U.S. FED.
NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006 (recapping a report issued by the Congressional Budget Office stating
that participation in IRA accounts has increased over the past few years); see also Pamela
Yip, More Need to Join IRA Bandwagon, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 20, 2006, at
1D (quoting Fidelity Investment's January 2006 report of a 50% increase in new
individual retirement accounts, and a 24% increase in IRA current-year contributions).
124 AARP, CONSUMER BEHAVIOR, EXPERIENCES, AND ATTITUDES: A COMPARISON BY
AGE GROUPS 33 (Princeton Survey Research Associates 1999).
125 See AARP, supra note 124, at 32 (noting that the lower a consumer's annual
income, the more likely it is that he/she has no long-term savings); see also U.S. FED.
NEWS, supra note 123 (affirming that typically the older and wealthier are more likely to
engage in long-term investments such as retirement savings plans).
126 Fidelity Investments' offers advice on retirement planning, college planning, and
annuities. See Fidelity Investments Home Page, http://www.fidelity.com (last visited Apr.
15, 2006). Likewise, Merrill Lynch offers advice to individual clients on estate planning,
business planning, investments and retirement. See Merrill Lynch Home Page,
http://www.ml.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
127 See Fidelity Investments, Fidelity Managed 529 Plans,
http://personal.fidelity.com/planning/college/content/fidelity-managed-529-plans.shtm.cv
sr?refhp=pr&ut=A7 (last visited Nov. 24, 2006) (attracting individuals by promoting
flexibility of 529 education plans); see also Timothy Middleton, Study Up for the Best
College-Saving Deal, MSN MONEY (Jan. 1, 2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com
/content/Pl04967.asp (positing that "[t]here's no better way to save for college than a 529
plan").
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and reflect the values placed upon saving today to plan for
tomorrow, e.g. the Code provides a deduction for funds that are
placed into retirement accounts. 128 When drafting tax policy,
Congress not only needs to focus on notions of economic efficiency
but also retain the values emphasized in American society. 129
The tax code should not hinder prudent taxpayers but rather
assist these diligent individuals in retaining sufficient after-tax
income to not only meet their tax liability responsibilities but
also feel free to contribute to long-term investment projects. The
Panel recognized this need when it stated:
Planning for the future - how much to save, for example would no longer be complicated by the code's current set of
elaborate rules. In addition, there would be fewer
unpleasant surprises each April because taxpayers would
not be caught off guard by phase-outs and the AMT that
force them to pay more taxes than anticipated. 130
C. The Attainability of the American Dream - We're Not in
Kansas Anymore
Another core value in American society is the ability to own a
home. 131 Indeed, a prevalent view is that the most important
asset an individual can purchase is a home.132 Throughout the
economic strata, home ownership is desired, respected, and
prided, but most especially in the lower levels.133 Home
128 See I.R.C. § 219 (West 2006) (permitting qualified deduction for contributions into
individual retirement accounts); see also Jeff Schnepper, Stretch Your IRA to Your
Grandkids, MSN MONEY, Oct. 10, 2005, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes
/Taxshelters/P33760.asp (explaining that long-term investments are means of taking
advantage of tax deferral benefits offered in Code).
129 See Tax Reform Debate, supra note 114, at 43-44 (focusing on key aspects of
formulating tax policy, including efficiency costs and social goals); see also PECHMAN,
supra note 4, at 134 (mentioning "equity, simplification, and better economic
performance" as goals of adequate tax policy reform).
130 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 114.
131 See Chris Ayers, Why the Property Panic? PerhapsDubya's Going to Take His Gift
Away, THE TIMES (LONDON), Mar. 14, 2006, at 19 (quoting President Reagan in 1984 as
saying "I want you to know that we will preserve the part of the American Dream which
the home-mortgage-interest deduction symbolises [sic]"); see also Mann, supra note 26, at
1348 (referring to homeownership as American Dream).
132 See Mansell, supra note 87 (highlighting America's passion for homeownership);
see also Nolan, supra note 22, at 210 (stating that owner-occupied housing is "single most
important investment asset held by most Americans").
133 See George W. Bush, Faith, Compassion, and the War on Poverty, 16 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLY 329, 333 (2002) ("Owning a home is a source of dignity for
families and stability for communities - and organizations like Habitat for Humanity
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ownership can benefit neighborhoods by promoting camaraderie,
improving the quality of the residential buildings, and increasing
the local property values.13 4 Those who own their homes have a
greater financial interest in attaining and preserving a quality
35
neighborhood because of how invested they are in their homes.1
Furthermore, owner-occupied housing produces residential areas
in which neighboring structures are benefited by an increase in
value in another neighboring structure.13 6 This value reciprocity
furthers the occupants' interests in retaining the desirable
quality of the neighborhood, which in turn benefits local
businesses.137 Because of its many benefits, home ownership has
been viewed by most as a respectable policy sought to be achieved
through the tax system.138
Recognizing this value, the Code has attempted to encourage
home ownership for the good of society.' 39 An important
provision in the Code that benefits homeowners is the deduction
make that dream possible for many low income Americans ... The budget I submit to
Congress next year will propose a three-fold increase in this funding - which will expand
homeownership, and the hope and pride that come with it."); see generally Greenberg,
supra note 96, at 326-34 (comparing values across upper, middle, and lower income
brackets, noting that home ownership is valued in all).
134 See Bush, supra note 133, at 333 (affirming that home ownership instills stability
into communities); see also GREENE, supra note 76, at 6 (listing benefits that result from
homeownership such as encouraging neighborhood
stability, promoting civic
responsibility, and improving maintenance of residential buildings).
135 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 316-17 (focusing on economic factors
pertaining to owner-occupants); see also Cassandra Netzke, Current Public Law and
Policy Issues: Rethinking Revitalization: Social Services in Segregation and
Concentrations of Poverty, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 145, 175 (2001) (discussing
negative implications lack of prevalent home-ownership can have on neighborhoods).
136 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 316 (pinpointing resulting benefits that
home improvements can have on neighboring homes); see also Julia Patterson Forrester,
Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 406-08 (1994) (analyzing
positive benefits that home ownership bestows upon entire communities).
137 See Forrester, supra note 136, at 407 (discussing benefits conferred upon greater
community at large due to increased home ownership); see also GREENE, supra note 76, at
8 (remarking on widespread effects of home mortgage interest deduction, i.e. spurring
"the goal of providing a 'decent home' and a 'suitable living environment' for all
Americans").
138 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (indicating that incentives for home ownership
should be retained through manners that makes them available to more people, thus
supporting home ownership as one policy goal); see also Mark Andrew Snider, The
Suburban Advantage: Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership Defensible?, 32 N. KY. L.
REV. 157, 187 (2005) (stating that "spurring homeownership is a laudable policy goal.").
139 See Forrester, supra note 136, at 397-98 (analyzing various advantages that tax
laws bestow upon those who choose to purchase homes in order to advance societal
benefits); see also Snider, supra note 138, at 173-76 (discussing a plethora of results the
Code aims to achieve, including neighborhood preservation and stability, improved
quality of life, and enhanced educational systems).
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for home mortgage interest. 14 0 In addition, the Code allows those
who itemize to deduct state and local property taxes. 14 1
Moreover, the Code provides for the exclusion of capital gain
income on the sale of a primary residence.14 2 It is evident that
individuals have chosen to take advantage of these options as
there has been an increase in home ownership since such tax
benefits were enacted.14 3 As discussed above, there are those who
are opposed to the current benefits bestowed upon homeowners
in the Code and feel that change is necessary. 14 4 Though their
arguments deserve reflection, they should only be used to reach a
satisfying compromise and not to eliminate such benefits,
because the value that owning a home holds in American society
is too important to be overlooked.145

140 See Forrester, supra note 136, at 397 (referring to home mortgage interest
deduction as "the most notable" federal income tax provision that promotes home
ownership); see also Jeff Schnepper, Home: The Mother of All Tax Shelters, MSN MONEY
(Oct. 17, 2005), http://moneycentral.msn.comlcontent/Taxes/Taxshelters/P41831.asp
(discussing availability of avenues that enable taxpayers to make use of home mortgage
tax shelter).
141 See I.R.C. § 164 (West 2006) (referencing § 164(a)(1) which allows the deduction
for state, local, and foreign real property taxes); see also Forrester, supra note 136, at 397
(affirming purpose of this deduction is to further promote home ownership).
142 See I.R.C. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(1) (West 2006) (defining residence broadly to include
not only houses but house trailers, house boats, stock in co-ops, and any other dwelling
place); see also Forrester, supra note 136, at 397 (explaining prevention of recognition of
gain on sale of principal residence if another residence is purchased within two years).
143 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (emphasizing that tax benefits for housing are
larger than entire budget of Department of Housing and Urban Development); see also
GREENE, supra note 76, at xii (referencing studies done in late 1970's indicating that as
much as one-third of owner-occupied housing in United States at that time would not
have been built if tax code did not decrease after-tax costs of purchasing homes).
144 See Mann, supra note 26, at 1351 (connecting home mortgage interest deduction
to negative occurrence and spreading of suburban sprawl); see also SHAVIRO, supra note
23, at 144 (claiming that tax scholars condemn home mortgage interest deduction as
defective).
145 See Mann, supra note 26, at 1354 (referring to Fannie Mae survey indicating that
majority of Americans who do not own their own homes wish that they did); see also Rep.
Kelly Continues Effort to Stop Proposed Elimination of Homeowners Tax Deductions, U.S.
FED. NEWS, Feb. 3, 2006, availableat http://suekelly.house.gov/News.asp
?ARTICLE3316=17951 (enforcing view that elimination of tax benefits to homeowners
would have severe negative and unfair repercussions to current residents of owneroccupied homes and to small businesses).
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D. Structuring Tax Policy to Influence Consumer Behavior Even Toto Tags Along
It is apparent that the federal government attempts to use tax
policy as an instrument to influence human behavior. 146 Changes
in tax policy affect the allocation of resources and the distribution
of economic activity. 147 Individual taxpayers respond to changes
in the tax code by altering the number of hours that they work,
which in turn affects the labor supply and various industries.148
The exact extent to which changes in the Code affect citizens'
motivations to save and invest are difficult to quantify or qualify
but it is apparent that taxes loom large in the back of most
people's minds.149 Some have questioned whether or not taxes
should be used as means to make particular activities more or
less attractive to people.150 Moreover, it has been suggested that
tax policies act as a form of discrimination, encouraging certain
activities or lifestyles while discouraging others.151 Nevertheless,
146 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 1 (referring to Congress' use of tax laws to
influence private behavior as "aggressive"); see also Jennifer C. Root, The Commissioner's
Clear Reflection of Income Power under §446(b) and the Abuse of Discretion Standard of
Review: Where Has the Rule of Law Gone, and Can We Get it Back?, 15 AKRON TAX J. 69,
82-83 (2000) (emphasizing importance of taxpayer notice and awareness of tax legislation
if legislation is to be effective in promoting certain types of behavior or furthering specific
policies).
147 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 1 (listing circumstances in which taxes
affect the allocation of resources including the labor supply, the stock market, and
housing); see also PECHMAN, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that one of the goals of
taxation is to promote economic growth through the movement of resources).
148 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 2-3 (noting that some evidence shows that
changes in income taxes might affect males and females differently); see also PECHMAN,
supra note 4, at 74 (asserting the role of the federal income tax as a stabilizer in the
economy, mentioning the tax effects on a taxpayer's disposable income).
149 See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 23-25 (cautioning readers to remember
that there are many variables that factor into analyzing the effects of tax policy on
behavior, indicating that it is difficult to reconcile the various areas simultaneously); see
also Jeff Schnepper, Tax Lessons for College Students, MSN MONEY (Mar. 22, 2006),
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Taxes/Cutyourtaxes/P144991.asp
(explaining that
even college students must consider how taxes affect their lives).
150 See Jed Graham, An Outside-the-Box Economist; Dollars and Sense: Martin
Feldstein Pointed Out the Pitfalls of High Taxes, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Jun. 10,
2005, at A03 (referring to economist Martin Feldstein's initiative to state that taxes can
actually have an adverse effect on human behavior); see also Michael W. Spicer, On
FriedrichHayek and Taxation: Rationality, Rules, and Majority Rule, NAT'L TAX J., Mar.
1995, at 103 (expounding Hayek's position that it is too difficult to use tax policy to
intentionally encourage particular types of economic behavior).
151 See Mann, supra note 26, at 1365 (asserting that the home mortgage interest
deduction discriminates against minorities because its structure systematically disfavors
the financial status of most minorities who tend to have lower incomes than Caucasians).;
see also Prepared Testimony of Senator Pete V. Domenici Before the Committee on Ways
and Means, S.722 - The USA Tax, FED. NEWS SERV., June 7, 1995 ("When an activity is
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it seems impossible to avoid the societal reflex that occurs when
changes are made to the Code.152 Regardless of whether it should
or should not occur, it is apparent that tax policy does affect
human behavior.153 One example of how tax policy drives
consumer choice is reflected by the preferential treatment given
to the automobile in the Code.154 Through various provisions, the
Code has indirectly supported the automobile as the dominant
form of transportation and taxpayers have responded.155 In fact,
"[i]n 2002, US workers made 77% of trips to work by driving
alone."156 Whether or not it is always directly intended, tax policy
can provide various impetuses for people to either act or refrain
from acting in particular ways. 157
Congress recently connected the preference for the automobile
with society's concerns about preserving energy and stimulating
the industries providing alternative sources of energy.158 In order
penalized in the tax code, it influences behavior. Taxpayers do less of those disfavored
activities. And the current code is doing a good job of discouraging saving. Americans are
only saving about 2.8 percent of GDP. This lack of saving leads to a shortage of
investment, which, in turn, leads to insufficient growth, stagnating incomes, and the loss
of high-wage jobs.").
152 See Graham, supra note 150, at A03 (finding large responses by individuals to tax
incentives and disincentives); see also Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining
that taxes influence the way citizens will use their money).
153 For example, the Code provides incentives for taxpayers to make charitable
contributions, and taxpayers in the higher income brackets have typically taken
advantage of these incentives. See Aaron & Pechman, supra note 5, at 22. In addition,
many state lawmakers are attempting to use tax policy to influence taxpayers to make
better health decisions, e.g. by implementing a cigarette tax. See Higher Cigarette Tax
Makes More Political Sense; Lawmakers May Have Settled on the Quick Fix, But This Tax
Will Save Lives, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 29, 2005, at A8. "Every taxing
decision.., influences behavior. That's a policy fact that lawmakers shouldn't ignore." Id.
154 See Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation
Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 588-90 (2005). In fact, driving has become the dominant
mode of transportation for commuters. See id. at 588. Spending for vehicle purchases,
which is the largest transportation subcomponent, is increasing. See U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures in 2002 (Feb. 2004), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann02.pdf.
155 See I.R.C. § 30B (West 2006) (providing various tax benefits under the Alternative
Motor Vehicle Credit); see also Mann, supra note 154, at 664 (affirming that the moving
deduction and the home mortgage interest deduction create demand for personal vehicle
travel because they encourage reduced living density).
156 Mann, supra note 154, at 592-593.
157 See Tax Reform Debate, supra note 114, at 1 (affirming that "[tiaxes change
people's behavior and influence the economy by altering incentives to work, consume,
save, and invest"); see also Mann, supra note 154, at 590 (commenting that "[t]he
evolutionary nature of the tax law and its immense complexity makes it almost inevitable
that provisions of the Internal Revenue Code will affect taxpayer choice in unanticipated,
and sometimes, contradictory ways").
158 Beginning in 2006, the clean fuel deduction that was available for purchasers of
hybrid vehicles became a credit. See IRS, Deduction for Hybrid Vehicles,
http://www.irs.gov/newsroomlarticle/O,,id=107766,00.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). In
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to help promote environmental awareness, the Code now
provides tax benefits to purchasers of hybrid automobiles.159 It
appears that taxpayers are eager to take advantage of this tax
break, while simultaneously helping the environment, because
there has been an increase in the sales of such vehicles as well as
an increase in the number of models available to consumers.160
Curiously, an interesting trend in the area of hybrid technology
has recently started to occur that speaks to the uncertainty of
human behavior. Initially, hybrid technology aimed to tap into
the environmental concerns of society and provide automobiles
that would not damage the environment.16 1 Currently, however,
hybrid technology is being used to increase vehicle qualities such
as size, speed, and horse power because those are the current
preferences in society. 162 Although people are willing to help the
environment, they seemingly are not willing to give up their
preferences for high speed, high class, and high power cars. 163
Developments like this are important for Congress to be aware of
because they reflect the power that prestige and status have in
the consumer industry. The recent trend in hybrid technology is

addition to the benefits offered for clean fuel vehicles, the Code also allows for a solar
power credit for those who opt to install solar panels in their homes. See Ashlea Ebeling,
Do Solar While the Credit Shines, FORBES, Dec. 12, 2005, at 192.
159 See I.R.C. § 30B (West 2006) (explaining various tax allowances available under
the Alternative Motor Vehicle Credit); see also New Tax Credit for 2006,
http://www.hybridcars.com/tax-deductions-credits.html
(last visited Nov. 14, 2006)
(outlining estimated tax credit amounts that coincide with each qualifying hybrid vehicle
on the market).
160 See Tom Incantalupo, More Tax Incentives for Hybrids in '06, NEWSDAY, Jan. 4,
2006, at A38 (noting that General Motors and Toyota offer hybrid vehicles); see also
Daniel Ramish, Government Regulatory Initiatives Encouraging the Development and
Sale of Gas/Electric Hybrid Vehicles: Transforming Hybrids from a Curiosity to an
Industry Standard, 30 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 231, 257 (2005) (supporting
states' enactment of laws that allow single-occupancy hybrid vehicles in high occupancy
vehicle lanes because such vehicles produce benefits that equate to carpooling).
161 See Mann, supra note 154, at 631 (noting that hybrid vehicles produce fewer
emissions than vehicles powered solely by conventional engines); see also Ramish, supra
note 160, at 243 (explaining that hybrid technology uses an electric motor to supplement a
traditional engine and thereby minimizes fuel consumption).
162 See Matthew L. Wald, Designed to Save, Hybrids Burn Gas in Drive for Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 17, 2005, at 16. The 2005 Honda Accord hybrid gets about the same gas
mileage as the conventional model, but it accelerates better due to the hybrid technology.
Id. The green-friendly image that goes along with hybrids is still attracting buyers and
these vehicles will still help the environment. Id. However, the extent of the benefit to the
environment is not quite as prominent anymore because of the need to satisfy the
consumer's desire for performance. Id.
163 See Wald, supra note 162 (noting that car manufacturers are utilizing hybrid
technology to produce vehicles that accelerate faster).
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just one example that indicates the emphasis people place on
status and the ability to purchase goods.

E. Likelihood of Enactment of Proposed Changes - Somewhere
Over the Rainbow
As noted, it is impossible to precisely foretell how people will
respond to changes in the tax policy.16 4 The optimal route for
Congress to take is to reflect upon the past, thoroughly examine
the present, and implement policies that will provide for the best
possible future.16 5 To satisfy as many as possible, Congress
should focus on the core values that pervade across the strata
like the desire to save for investments and to own a home. In
light of these core values, the Panel's proposals will most likely
not be enacted in their current forms any time soon. Regarding
the home mortgage interest deduction, the Panel's proposal does
not sufficiently provide for those who have relied upon the
existence of the deduction.16 6 The Panel's recommendation fails
to provide consistency and reliability. If Congress enacts such a
drastic change too abruptly it will have adverse effects in many
areas, including but not limited to the real estate market. As for
the proposal regarding the AMT, the form of the proposal would
be eagerly welcomed except for the requirement of revenue164 It is interesting to note that, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the
Congressional Budget Office, in 1981, provided some insight as to possible
recommendations to be made to the home mortgage interest deduction, and many of the
possible proposals discussed at that time are evident in the 2005 Panel's plan. See
generally GREENE, supra note 76. This reflects the fact that it is very difficult to determine
the best possible course for a tax policy because there are many considerations that need
to be taken into account. Id. It is interesting that 20 years later Congress is still plagued
by many of the same quandaries. Id. The actions and interactions of human behavior
cause it to be extremely difficult if not impossible to predict the consequences of all
actions. See also Spicer, supra note 150, at 104.
165 The GAO suggests that equity, economic efficiency, and a combination of
"simplicity, transparency, and administrability" are the core criteria to look at in
evaluating tax policy. See Tax Reform Debate, supra note 114, at 35. Economists have also
noted there is controversy regarding the amount of relative emphasis that should be
placed on equity and economic objectives when deciding tax policy. See PECHMAN, supra
note 4, at 6.
166 Although the Panel explained that taxpayers would be allowed to claim either the
Home Credit or the mortgage interest deduction during the transitional period, it does not
seem sufficient to satisfy those taxpayers who perhaps purchased their home in the year
the transition period began. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 238. Furthermore, the current
$1 million mortgage interest limit would be reduced annually during the transition
period, thereby reducing the amount of the deduction that taxpayers could take. Id.
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neutrality.167 Focusing in on the value society places on savings,
one can understand why people detest the AMT. Although
eliminating the AMT would satisfy the greatest number of
people, it is probably not likely that its immediate annihilation
will occur in the near future unless the government determines
more appeasing ways to make up the devastating loss of
revenue. 168
IV. POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS

In light of this analysis of human behavior, how could the
Panel alter its recommendations to better serve society?
Beginning with the home mortgage interest deduction, let us
assume that the Home Credit as it is suggested is implemented.
Although the Panel recognizes the value of home ownership, it is
unfairly discriminating against current homeowners at the
middle to upper income tax brackets.1 69 The Panel suggests a 5
year period over which the current deductions will be phased
out. 17 0 However, this suggestion is insufficient because it does
not coincide with the principle that individuals should be able to

167 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 42 (explaining that the concept of revenue-neutrality
directed the Panel's suggestions to be "designed to collect roughly the same amount of
money that the federal government projects it will collect under the current tax system");
see also Tax Reform Debate, supra note 114, at 69 (defining revenue neutral as "[a] term
applied to tax bills or proposals [that] are designed to raise the same amount of revenue
as the system that is being replaced.").
168 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (positing that the AMT system will remain in effect
until the government can determine alternate methods of revenue); see also R. Jason
Griffin, The Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: Is it Touching People that it Shouldn't
Be?, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX. L.J. 259, 284, 288 (2004) (arguing that a repeal of AMT system
alone without an alternative could lead to tax revenue losses ranging from $647 billion to
$802 billion).
169 The Panel explains that regional limits would be established on a county-bycounty basis in order to account for the varying differences in prices of homes. See
REPORT, supra note 6, at 237. On its face, this seems sufficient, until one notes that the
maximum limit suggested is $411,704. See id. The Panel even recognizes that a
homeowner in Los Angeles, for example, who very likely has a home mortgage loan
greater than $411,704, will not be allowed to deduct the interest on the loan exceeding
that amount. Id.; see also Charles B. Rangel & Phil Angelides, The Tax Plan that Cheats
California, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at B13. The $411,704 cap in California is similar to
the $568,890 cap in New York that would discriminate against homeowners with a home
mortgage loan higher than the cap amount. Id..
170 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 238 (displaying a table providing the transition rules
for the Home Credit); see also Robyn A. Friedman, Tax Panel Targets Mortgage
Deductions, SuN-SENTINEL, Nov. 7, 2005, at 11 (listing proposed changes by the Panel
such as replacing the interest deduction with a tax credit, eliminating the deduction for
mortgage interest on second homes, and eliminating interest on home equity loans).
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rely upon the tax code for consistency.171 Therefore, a better plan
might be to include an extensive grandfather clause, allowing
those who, at the time of implementation, have home mortgages
72
to continue to take advantage of the current deductions.1
Simultaneously, the Home Credit could then be phased in to new
home buyers who would be aware of the tax provisions and thus
it would be more in line with a system of reliability and fairness.
Continuing with the notion of trying to implement the Panel's
Home Credit, the concept of the Home Credit is merit-worthy
because its intention is to allow more people to take advantage of
tax benefits.17 3 However, the structure of the credit is flawed,
74
especially its suggested determination of the regional limits.1
In light of stratification in society by wealth, the government
must examine each geographic area not only narrowly but
realistically if it is to fairly accomplish this feat.17 5 If regional
limits are to be imposed, they need to more accurately reflect the

171 See Tax Reform Debate, supra note 114, at 47 (emphasizing the importance of the
transparency of the tax system, i.e. the type of tax system taxpayers are able to
understand and allows them to better predict their future tax liabilities); see also Kenneth
W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency,Simplicity, Fairness,25 OHIO N.U.L.
REV. 101, 102-03 (1999) (stating that tax transparency is satisfied when tax rules are
written, uniformly applied, and sets forth details); see also Paul R. McDaniel, The Pursuit
of National Tax Policies in a Globalized Environment: Principal Paper: Trade and
Taxation, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1621, 1622 (2001) (enumerating six factors in
transparent tax systems such as the tax base, tax rates, who is to pay taxes, when taxes
are to be paid, how taxes are applied, and how taxes are to be administered).
172 See SHAVIRO, supra note 23, at 144-47 (analyzing possible scenarios involving
grandfather clauses during transition periods); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato,
Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and Kaplow, 75
VA. L. REV. 1155, 1156-57 (1989) (claiming grandfather clauses can prove to be
advantageous).
173 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 72 (stating that the Panel's motivation for altering
the home mortgage interest deduction was to allow it to be shared more evenly among
taxpayers, not just the minority of taxpayers who itemize); see also Mann, supra note 26,
at 1365-68 (arguing that a change from the current home mortgage interest deductions
would benefit lower income citizens and make homeownership more accessible).
174 See Michael Strauss, Tax Reform Panel Declares Open Season on Home Owners,
NAT'L ASS'N OF HOME BUILDERS (Nov. 7, 2005), http://www.nahb.org/newsdetails
.aspx?sectionlD=875&newsID=1632 (indicating that not only will the suggested regional
limits accelerate tax liabilities of current home owners but they will also serve to depress
home values); see also Calvin H. Johnson, Was it Lost? Personal Deductions under Tax
Reform, 59 SMU L. REV. 689, 703 (2006) (referring to the large variations in the regions of
the country).
175 The Panel suggests relying on a county-by-county analysis in order to determine
the regional limits. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 237. Though this seems plausible, the
Panel chose to set the maximum regional limit at an amount that is insufficient to meet
the needs of the wealthier taxpayers, because their home mortgage loans will likely
exceed the max limit. Id.; see also Johnson, supra note 174, at 703.
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true median price of a home.17 6 However, with the additional
requirement of an annual adjustment, the regional limits will
most likely add to the complexity already in existence in the Code
which is completely unnecessary and undesired.17 7 It appears
that, although a meritorious idea in theory, in actuality the
Panel's suggestion of regional limits would only serve to further
the intricacies of the tax system.
Following with the idea of a Home Credit, perhaps a broader
credit would suffice. For example, the Panel could possibly
increase the credit amount above the proffered 15%.178 This
would serve the Panel's goal of allowing more taxpayers to take
advantage of the tax benefits, while also serving to help those
taxpayers who have a higher primary home mortgage loan, since
their interest payments will be higher. In addition, the Panel
should suggest expanding the Home Credit to account for
indebtedness not only on a principal residence but on a secondary
residence as well.179 Furthermore, the Panel should not have
eliminated the tax benefits that taxpayers received from home
equity loans.1 8 0 In conjunction with the importance of owning a
home, taxpayers also value being able to improve their homes,
thereby raising property values and contributing to the
176 For example, in 2003, many cities had median prices of homes that were very
close to or exceeded the maximum regional limit. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2003 MEDIAN
VALUE (DOLLARS) FOR ALL OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS, http://www.census.gov
/Press-Releasewww/2005/2003valuecity.pdf. In fact, 25% of all the home loans in
California last year exceeded the panel's caps on mortgages eligible for the tax break. See
Strauss, supra note 174. According to the California Association of Realtors, the median
housing price of $568,890 for a Californian single-family home in August of 2005 was a
20.1% increase from the previous year, and a 300% increase from 1997. Robert Chambers,
Pushed Out: A Call for Inclusionary Housing Programs in Local Condominium
Conversion Legislation, 42 CAL. W.L. REV. 355, 357-58 (2006).
177 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (criticizing the Panel's suggested regional limit plan
because it is sure to lead to further complexity in the tax code due to its requirement for
county-by-county analysis and annual adjustments); see also Celia Whitaker, Bridging the
Book-Tax Accounting Gap, 115 YALE L.J. 680, 700 (2005) (stating that the Tax Code is one
of increasing complexity).
178 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (comparing the effects of the 15 percent Home
Credit on taxpayers in tax brackets above and below 15 percent); see also Johnson, supra
note 174, at 691 (doubting whether the 15 percent tax credit will be effective).
179 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73 (noting that the Home Credit is available to all
taxpayers but only on the primary residence); see also Gabriel 0. Aitsebaomo, The
Individual Alternative Minimum Tax: An Argument in Favor of Repeal, 74 UMKC L. REV.
335, 345-46 (2005) (stating that deductions were not allowed for secondary homes under
AMT).
180 See Forrester, supra note 136, at 383 (arguing that home equity loans provide
benefits such as lower interest rates); see also Charles C. Boettcher, Taking Texas Home
Equity for a Walk, But Keeping it on a Short Leash!, 30 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 197, 207 (1999)
(writing that home equity loans offered an advantage in interest rates over other loans).
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neighborhood.lS1 As noted, requiring an annual recalculation of
regional limits will most likely prove to be too complex; however,
allowing for a deduction of 15% of interest paid on mortgages
that for many taxpayers will not cover the entire amount of the
mortgage seems insufficient. Therefore, if the Panel wishes to
pursue the option of the Home Credit, it should either allow for a
larger percentage of interest to be credited and/or increase the
maximum limits of indebtedness, which include more than just
first lien loans.
Another option is to abandon the concept of the Home Credit
and utilize a modified version of the current home mortgage
interest deduction.
The Panel could suggest limiting the
maximum amounts of indebtedness against which the interest
expense is deducted.1 8 2 By lowering the current maximum
amount of indebtedness which is $1.1 million, several benefits
could result. First, offering a lower maximum amount might
encourage taxpayers to assume less debt if they knew they could
not deduct some of the expenses. 8 3 Second, this reduction would
also increase funds for the federal government because taxpayers
would not be allowed to deduct as much interest expense. 184
Third, this reduction would appease several critics who argue
that the current deduction does not support home ownership but
rather fosters the purchase of luxury homes.185 Finally, this
181 See Forrester, supra note 136, at 406-08 (analyzing positive benefits that home
ownership bestows upon an entire community such as increasing accumulation of
homeowners and an increasing number of socially active and responsible citizens because
of their increased stake in the community); see also Mann, supra note 26, at 1354-55
(stating that homeownership remains a goal for most Americans and is seen to foster
"homeowner activism" as homeowners have a greater stake in the conditions and values
of the community than a home renter).
182 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (indicating that it is likely the home mortgage
interest deduction could remain in place for primary residences but with a reduced
maximum amount of indebtedness, possibly in the range of $300,000 to $500,000 as
opposed to $1 million); see also Mathias, supra note 172, at 72-76 (arguing that the
deduction for interest on home equity indebtedness allows homeowners to avoid
disallowance of personal interest).
183 For example, if taxpayers knew they could not deduct the interest on home equity
loans, they might be less inclined to assume increased debt. See Schnepper, supra note 68.
Moreover, current deductions motivate people to invest in second homes. See also
Mathias, supra note 172, at 72-74.
184 See Schnepper, supra note 68 (reminding readers that the changes suggested for
the home mortgage interest deduction are structured in a way to make up for the revenue
that would be lost from the elimination of the AMT); see also Mathias, supra note 172, at
75 (estimating that a cap would raise $52 billion).
185 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 73 (affirming that changing the home mortgage
interest deduction would help to curtail the current subsidy for luxury and vacation
homes); see also Mathias, supra note 172, at 73-74 (reasoning that the deductions have
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reduction would also appease homeowners because they could
still expect to deduct some interest expense and be able to take
advantage of the remainder of the itemized deductions offered in
the Code.' 8 6 If such a limit reduction were proposed, it should
also be implemented gradually in order to alleviate the
imposition on current homeowners.
A final option would be to abstain from altering the current
deductions allowed in the Code while determining alternate
methods of raising revenue for the federal government.i8 7 For
example, the Panel could look for additional revenue from outside
the income tax system. For instance, the government could use
taxes to drive human behavior in ways that would lead to a
healthier society, by implementing a large, federal excise tax on
cigarettes.18s Consistent with the heightened awareness for the
conservation of the environment, the federal government could
also impose a commuter tax which would lead to increased
revenue and possible environmental benefits.18 9 Moreover, it
might be time to retreat from the automobile's favored status,
thereby increasing tax revenues and reducing pollution.190
Furthermore, there are other methods the government might

only caused investment in secondary luxury homes and failed to satisfy the goal of
encouraging more homeowners).
186 The home mortgage interest deduction provides the impetus for most taxpayers to
elect to itemize their deductions as opposed to choosing the standard deduction. See
REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
187 Because the Panel suggested the much-desired elimination of the AMT, it is
attempting to supplement this projected loss of revenue by limiting the benefits bestowed
upon homeowners under the tax code. See Strauss, supra note 174.
188 See William N. Evans, Jeanne S. Ringel, & Diana Stech, Tobacco Taxes and
Public Policy to DiscourageSmoking, 13 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 44-51 (James M.
Poterba ed., 1999) (explaining many adverse health reasons why tobacco should be taxed
but also warning that the ability to pay concept could be implicated since it appears that
an increase in cigarette taxes would predominantly affect lower-income taxpayers); see
also Higher Cigarette Tax Makes More PoliticalSense; Lawmakers May Have Settled on
the Quick Fix, But This Tax Will Save Lives, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 29, 2005, at
A8 (noting how state lawmakers are using cigarette taxes).
189 Mayor Michael Bloomberg of NY pushed for the revival of the commuter tax in
NYC. See Dan Janison & Bryan Virasami, Mayor: Burbs Owe City, In Fight to Revive
Commuter Tax, Bloomberg Says Outlying Property Values Tied to the City, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 15, 2005, at A03. Mayor Bloomberg claimed that the suburban property values rise
and fall on the city's success; therefore, the imposition of a commuter tax, i.e. a tax on
those who commute from the suburbs, would be a form of payback to NYC. Id.
190 See Mann, supra note 154, at 613-19 (discussing various transportation
alternatives such as public transportation or bicycling that should be encouraged in order
to benefit personal health and environmental improvement).
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employ to raise revenue, but which are beyond the scope of this
paper, i.e. changing budget expenditures.191
Regardless of the option chosen, the Panel should also realize
that Americans are not willing to sacrifice their preferences, such
as luxury vacation homes or the ability to take out home equity
loans to improve their residences.1 92 As a result, the Panel
should allow for tax subsidies to be available on these types of
debts while attempting to quiet some of the criticisms of the
current deduction. The Panel could attempt to implement tax
provisions that would boost the industries the home mortgage
interest deduction has allegedly harmed.193 For example, the
Panel could provide tax subsidies in the Code for rental housing,
seeing as how those who rent pay monthly expenses and are
unable to deduct anything for them.194 Accordingly, the Panel
could suggest a rental expense deduction, allowing for an annual
percentage of rental expense to be deducted.1 9 5 Moreover, the
Panel could implement provisions to offer tax incentives for
consumers to invest in middle-America industries like factories
that produce equipment.1 96 The Panel must remember that tax
191 See Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax
Legislative Processes, 43 B.C.L. REV. 863, 865 (2002) (affirming that "the tax and budget
legislative processes are increasingly linked").
192 See Boat Owners Association, supra note 94, at 6(1) (commenting on how boat
owners have come to rely on the deductibility of their boats' mortgage interest through
the secondary residence deduction for boats that serve as residences which the Panel
suggests eliminating, and stating that such a change is not likely to occur any time soon);
but see, Poll Shows Majority of U.S. Adults Support Major Tax Reform, Are Willing to
Give Up Some Deductions to Make Tax System Simpler U.S., U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 5,
2006, availableat http://releases.usnewswire.comlGetRelease.asp?id=63577 (revealing
that a small majority of taxpayers with incomes over $75,000 per year who were most
likely to be able to take advantage of the itemized deductions were willing to sacrifice
such deductions in order to remove some complexity in the Code, suggesting that
repairing difficulty in tax preparation is the most pressing need in tax reform to citizens).
193 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 71 (displaying disproportionate impact that housing
investments may have on business and technology industries, such as lack of
investments, lower worker productivity, lower wages, and lower standard of living); see
also SHAVIRO, supra note 23, at 144 (criticizing the home mortgage interest deduction for
how it distorts individual investment choices).
194 See GREENE, supra note 76, at xvii (noting that the suggestion for a deduction or a
credit for renters was made back in 1981); see also SHAVIRO, supra note 23, at 144
(affirming that the home mortgage interest deduction sways people towards investing in
home ownership as opposed to rental housing).
195 See GREENE, supra note 76, at xvii (promoting a tax subsidy for renters because it
might encourage better apartment maintenance and enable some households to remain
renters).
196 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 71 (contrasting the close to 0 percent tax rate on
owner-occupied housing investments with the 22% tax rate on business sector
investments).
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policy will inevitably affect the state of the economy and the
allocation of resources; therefore, it can appease some critics by
implementing changes that will lead to positive results in
industries that have heretofore felt slighted.
Regarding the AMT, it seems that there are ways to
successfully accomplish the Panel's suggestion of complete
elimination. Keeping in mind the desire to encourage savings,
eliminating the AMT would be ideal because it would provide for
a decrease in tax liability, meaning more money to pocket or to
invest.19 7 The outright elimination of the AMT appears to be
conditional upon the occurrence of either of two options: (i)
immediately obtaining satisfactory alternative sources of
revenue, or (ii) adjusting the regular income tax rates to make up
the difference.1 98 One way to find immediate alternative sources
of revenue would be to alter the amounts allowed for the
remainder of the itemized deductions. In order to reduce the
benefits to those who itemize while retaining the all-important
home mortgage interest deduction, the government could lower
the amounts allowed under the itemized deductions, thereby
increasing revenue. 199 This compromise would satisfy the
homeowners because they could retain the most important
deduction, the government because it would receive an increase
in funds, and the non-homeowners because they would not feel as
though they were being snubbed continuously. 2 00 On the other
197 The Panel did recognize the importance of savings when it stated, "Household
saving is crucial to the health of our economy and to the financial health of American
families." See REPORT, supra note 6, at 89. The AMT is on a path to cause even more
damage to American families as it is projected that, in 2010, "the percentage of married
couples with children paying AMT in all income brackets is projected to be 39 percent."
See TurboTax, FAQs on the Alternative Minimum Tax, http://turbotax.intuit.com
/tax-help/FAQontheAlternativeMinimumTax.jhtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
198 See Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 151 (stating that the AMT could be repealed and
its provisions could be incorporated into the regular tax system in order to improve
simplicity); see also Novack, supra note 42, at 210 (referring to how the "President's
reform panel made clear how hard it would be to fix the AMT without busting the
budget").
199 Sections 161-223 of the Internal Revenue Code provide itemized deductions for
individuals that are available once the taxpayer chooses to forego the standard deduction.
See I.R.C. §§ 161-223 (West 2006). The Panel also suggested the elimination of the
deduction for state and local taxes. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 83.
200 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 83 (explaining that the Panel wants the
expenditures for state and local taxes to be treated like any other nondeductible personal
expense, that way the cost of these services would be borne by those who want them, not
by every taxpayer in the country); see also Edward Schnee, Interest Deduction for
Individuals:Review and Update, 12 AKRON TAX J. 181, 194 (1996) (emphasizing the value
of the deduction for interest expense by stating that "[olne of the most important
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hand, the Panel could suggest eliminating the AMT while
simultaneously increasing the tax rates under the regular tax
system. 20 1 This decision would not necessarily serve to make
taxpayers happy because they would still be paying
approximately the same amount of taxes, but at least it would
alleviate the frustrations of working through a dual tax
system. 202
In the event that the loss of revenue from an outright
elimination of the AMT is too much to bear, there are
First, the Panel could suggest the overdue
alternatives.
the
AMT to properly index for inflation. 2 0 3 Next,
of
adjustment
the AMT could be phased out over a period of five to ten years,
depending upon estimates of the time required to establish
adequate alternatives. It is important to recognize that the AMT
in its current form is no longer serving the goals for which it was
designed. 204 The entire AMT system, although it provides
important federal funds, does so in way that only serves to
confuse and confound taxpayers and tax preparers. 20 5 It is no
exceptions to the disallowance of personal interest is the deductibility of qualified
residence interest").
201 For example, the actual percentage rates could be increased within each category
of taxpayer, such as individual or married, to make up for the revenue that would be lost
with the elimination of the AMT. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2006). The regular income tax
system could be modified to ensure that every taxpayer who has economic income in a tax
period pays some minimum amount of tax without the complexity of the AMT system. See
Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 150.
202 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 85-86 (referring to the AMT as "the most vivid
example of the wasteful complexity that has been built into our system to limit the
availability of some tax benefits").
203 See Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 152-53 (suggesting that the AMT be modified by
indexing it to adjust for inflation and further increase it if necessary to target the wealthy
segments of society); but see Sugin, supra note 48, at 1271-75 (warning that although
indexing would be a good start there are "fundamental flaws" in the AMT structure that
may not be alleviated through indexing alone).
204 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 (stating that "the individual AMT has failed to
achieve its goal of making sure all well-to-do Americans pay taxes"); see also Karlinsky,
supra note 17, at 139 (noting that even with a wide range of opinions about tax policy, a
consensus was reached that "the current AMT system is not meeting its originally
intended policy goals, is overly complex, and is not readily administrable by taxpayers or
the government.").
205 The Congressional Budget Office noted that many taxpayers have looked to
computer software in order to help alleviate the complications that the AMT causes. See
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, The Alternative Minimum Tax, in REVENUE AND TAX
POLICY BRIEF 1, 7 (Apr. 15, 2004), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5386
&sequence=0. Recognizing the burden on taxpayers, the Panel recommends the
elimination of the AMT under both of its suggested plans, thereby freeing millions of
taxpayers from having to undertake the painful and complex series of calculations and
worksheets just to determine whether they are entitled to a tax benefit or whether it is to
be taken away by the AMT. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 86.
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longer ensuring that everyone pays a minimum amount of tax
even if they partake in special preferences; rather it is ensuring
that millions of taxpayers pay additional funds to the
government because the system has not been properly
updated. 2 06 The Panel could also attempt to revert to the "pre1986 add-on minimum tax system in which a separate tax is
added to the regular tax when the sum of tax preferences exceed
some specified amount such as the regular tax liability."2 07 This
could be implemented after the phase-out of the adjusted AMT
was complete; however, the Panel would face the daunting task
of choosing which preferences would be limited.2 08 Regardless of
how and when the AMT is eliminated, there are few who would
deny that it is likely to be and should be erased from the Code
sometime in the future. 20 9
CONCLUSION

The current federal income tax system is in dire need of
reform. Its unnecessary complexity inundates taxpayers with
verbose content and forces many individuals to obtain tax
preparatory assistance. The President's Advisory Panel proposed
several changes including altering the home mortgage interest
deduction and eliminating the AMT. As they stand, the Panel's
recommendations are attempts to satisfy two of the core values of
American society which are the importance of owning a home
and having the capacity to save. However, the Panel needs to
reconsider not only the forms of these recommendations but also
the methods of implementation. Studying the successes and
failures of past changes as well as gaining an understanding of
current predilections will help legislators determine the best
ways to proceed with future reforms. Legislators will obtain
206 See REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 (noting that the failure to index the AMT is
significant).
207 Karlinsky, supranote 17, at 153.
208 See Karlinsky, supra note 17, at 153-54 (mentioning that the pre-1986 system was
not sufficient and so the Panel would have to implement the necessary changes); see also
Sugin, supra note 47, at 1273 (noting that "the AMT preferences bear little resemblance
to the real preferences that are now in the Code, namely the reduced rates on capital
gains and dividends").
209 See REVENUE AND TAX POLICY BRIEF, supra note 205, at 1 (Apr. 15, 2004)
(commenting on the increased complexity that plagues millions of taxpayers); see also
Schnepper, supra note 66 (referring to the proposed elimination of the AMT as "This one's
a winner!").
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insight into how to successfully implement tax policy by studying
human behavior and appreciating the concerns felt by people
from all levels of society. Just like Dorothy in The Wizard of Oz,
most Americans treasure their homes and are eager to be able to
adequately plan and provide for their futures. Perhaps all that is
needed in the tax code is a brain, a heart, and some courage.

